# NTWE: A Natural Combination of NTRU and LWE 

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August 16, 2023

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- Consider both the provable and concrete hardness of NTWE problem
- Construct and parametrize a NTWE-based cryptosystem


## Lattice-Based Cryptography

- Primary candidate for post-quantum cryptography

- Lattice-based KEM and signature algorithm to be standardized by NIST


## Assumptions in Lattice-Based Cryptography

- Primary two building blocks are NTRU [HPS98] and LWE [Reg05] problems
- Interesting to investigate alternative hardness assumptions
- We introduce the NTWE problem as a new problem for lattice-based cryptography


## Problem Statements

- Use ring $R_{q}=\mathbb{Z}_{q}[X] /\left(X^{n}+1\right)$ with integers $n, q$
- Typical parameters $q=3329, n=256$ and $k<5$


## Module-LWE MLWE(k)

Distinguish between uniformly random
$\left(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \in R_{q}^{m \times k}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}} \in R_{q}^{m}\right)$ and $(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}}=\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}})$ with uniformly random $\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}$ and small $\overline{\boldsymbol{s}} \in R_{q}^{k}, \overline{\boldsymbol{e}} \in R_{q}^{m}$

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## NTRU

Distinguish between uniformly random $h \in R_{q}$ and $h=g f^{-1}$ for small $g, f \in R_{q}$

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## Module NTRU MNTRU(k)

Distinguish between uniformly random $\overline{\boldsymbol{H}} \in R_{q}^{m \times k}$ and $\overline{\boldsymbol{H}}=\overline{\boldsymbol{G F}}^{-1}$ and small $\overline{\boldsymbol{G}} \in R_{q}^{m \times k}, \overline{\boldsymbol{F}} \in R_{q}^{k \times k}$

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## NTWE Problem NTWE(k)

Distinguish between uniformly random ( $\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \in R_{q}^{m \times k}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}} \in R_{q}^{m}$ ) and $\left(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}}=(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}}) f^{-1}\right)$ with uniformly random $\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}$, small $\overline{\boldsymbol{e}} \in R_{q}^{m}, \overline{\boldsymbol{s}} \in R_{q}^{k}$ and $f \in R_{q}$

## Problem Hardness

## Provable Hardness

- NTWE problem a natural combination of NTRU and LWE problems
- Can easily see that the NTWE problem is not easier than either of these problems


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## Concrete Hardness

- NTWE problem naturally corresponds to a lattice problem
- The hardness of this lattice problem gives a concrete hardness estimate for the NTWE problem


## Provable Relation to MLWE problem

- Given $\operatorname{MLWE}(k)$ instance $\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \in \mathbb{R}_{q}^{m \times k}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}} \in \mathbb{R}_{q}^{m}$
- Sample $f$ from correct distribution and $\left(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}} \cdot f^{-1}\right)$ is an NTWE $(k)$ instance
- Solving $\operatorname{NTWE}(k)$ instance gives solution to original MLWE $(k)$ instance


## Provable Relation to NTRU Problem

- Given NTRU instance with multiple samples $h_{i}=g_{i} f^{-1}$
- Sample $\boldsymbol{A}$ uniformly at random and produce NTWE instance with

$$
\boldsymbol{b}=\boldsymbol{A} \boldsymbol{h}_{[1, \ldots, k]}+\boldsymbol{h}_{[k+1, \ldots k+m]}\left(\boldsymbol{A} \boldsymbol{g}_{[1, \ldots, k]}+\boldsymbol{g}_{[k+1, \ldots k+m]}\right) \cdot f^{-1}
$$

- Solving NTWE instance implies solution to original NTRU instance


## Reduction From More Structured NTWE to MNTRU Problem

- More structured variant of $\operatorname{NTWE}(k)$ is at least as hard as $\operatorname{MNTRU}(k+1)$
- Additional structure might make the NTWE problem harder
- More natural to assume that less structure corresponds to harder problems


## Concrete Hardness of NTWE Problem

- NTWE corresponds to problem of finding unusually short vector in a lattice


## NTWE(k) Lattice

Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times k n}, \boldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times n}$

## Concrete Hardness of NTWE Problem

- NTWE corresponds to problem of finding unusually short vector in a lattice
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## NTWE(k) Lattice

Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times k n}, \boldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times n}$
$\operatorname{MNTRU}(k+1)$ Lattice
Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times(k+1) n}$

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- NTWE ( $k$ ) lattice very similar to $\operatorname{MLWE}(k+1)$ lattice


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## $\operatorname{MNTRU}(k+1)$ Lattice

Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times(k+1) n}$

$$
\text { MLWE }(k+1) \text { Lattice }
$$

Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times(k+1) n}, \boldsymbol{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times 1}$

## Concrete Hardness of NTWE Problem

- NTWE corresponds to problem of finding unusually short vector in a lattice
- NTWE(k) with $\boldsymbol{H}=\boldsymbol{A} \| \boldsymbol{B}$ gives same type of lattice as MNTRU $(k+1)$
- NTWE ( $k$ ) lattice very similar to $\operatorname{MLWE}(k+1)$ lattice
- Concrete hardness of these types of lattice problems is well studied [CN11, Che13, APS15, ACD ${ }^{+}$18]


## NTWE( $k$ ) Lattice

Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times k n}, \boldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times n}$

## $\operatorname{MNTRU}(k+1)$ Lattice

Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times(k+1) n}$

## MLWE $(k+1)$ Lattice

Lattice given by $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times(k+1) n}, \boldsymbol{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m n \times 1}$

## NTWE-Based Cryptosystem



## Cryptosystem Construction

- Use public matrix $\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \in R_{q}^{k \times(k-1)}$
- Ciphertext is $k$ samples from $\operatorname{MLWE}(k)$ instance
- Decryption correct as products of $\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{e}}, f, \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}^{\prime}, e^{\prime}, \overline{\boldsymbol{e}}^{\prime \prime}$ small


## Comparable MLWE-Based Cryptosystem

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \qquad\left|\begin{array}{c}
\text { Alice } \\
\hline \\
\left.c_{1}=\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}^{\prime} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{b}}=\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}}\right) \\
\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}_{2}=\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}^{\prime} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{A}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}}^{\prime \prime}
\end{array}\right| \\
& M=\left\lfloor 2\left(c_{1}-\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}_{2} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}\right) / q\right\rceil
\end{aligned}
$$

## Cryptosystem Construction

- Public matrix $\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \in R_{q}^{k \times k}$
- Ciphertext is $k+1$ samples from MLWE ( $k$ ) instance
- Decryption correct as products of $\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{e}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}^{\prime}, \overline{\boldsymbol{e}}^{\prime \prime}$ and $e^{\prime}$ small


## Parametrizations of NTWE-Based Cryptosystem

- Parametrizations with same ring $R=\mathbb{Z}[X] /\left(X^{256}+1\right)$ and modulos $q=3329$ as in Kyber [SAB ${ }^{+}$22]
- Similar distributions for $\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}$ and $\overline{\boldsymbol{e}}$ as in Kyber
- More efficient than Kyber as requires fewer operations of equivalent cost

| Version | NTWE-768 | Kyber-768 | NTWE-1024 | Kyber-1024 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Core SVP | 182 | 183 | 256 | 256 |
| Dimension of $\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}$ | $3 \times 2$ | $3 \times 3$ | $4 \times 3$ | $4 \times 4$ |
| PK size (bytes) | 1184 | 1184 | 1568 | 1568 |
| CT size (bytes) | 1152 | 1088 | 1536 | 1568 |
| $\delta$ | $2^{-182}$ | $2^{-164}$ | $2^{-153}$ | $2^{-174}$ |

## Ciphertext Compression

## MLWE ciphertext

Without compression

- MLWE-based cryptosystems use ciphertext compression to allow for smaller ciphertexts
- Ciphertext compression not suitable for all applications
- NTWE-based cryptosystem without ciphertext compression allows more efficient encryption and decryption

| $c_{1}$ | $c_{2}$ |
| :--- | :--- |

With compression


NTWE ciphertext

| $c_{1}$ | $\mathrm{C}_{2}$ |
| :--- | :--- |

## Efficiency of Operations

## Alice

- Multiplication, inversion and addition in $R_{q}$ efficient with NTT
- Multiplication and inversion in $R_{2}$ during decryption less efficient as not performed with
- Sampling $f$ such that it is trivial in $R_{2}$ ensures no operations in $R_{2}$ are required

$$
\begin{gathered}
M=\left\lfloor 2\left(c_{1} f-\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}_{2} \cdot \overline{\mathbf{s}}\right) / q\right\rceil f_{2}^{-1} \\
M=\left\lfloor 2\left(c_{1}-\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}_{2} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}\right) / q\right\rceil
\end{gathered}
$$

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- Multiplication, inversion and addition in $R_{q}$ efficient with NTT
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Alice

$$
\begin{gathered}
\frac{\left(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}}=(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \cdot \overline{\mathbf{s}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}}) f^{-1}\right)}{(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}, \overline{\boldsymbol{b}}=\overline{\boldsymbol{A}} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}})} \\
\frac{c_{1}=\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}^{\prime} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{b}}+e^{\prime}+\lfloor M q / 2\rceil}{\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}_{2}=\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}^{\prime} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{A}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}}^{\prime \prime}}
\end{gathered}
$$

$$
M=\left\lfloor 2\left(c_{1} f-\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}_{2} \cdot \overline{\boldsymbol{s}}\right) / q\right\rceil
$$

$$
M=\left\lfloor 2\left(c_{1}-\overline{\boldsymbol{c}}_{2} \cdot \overline{\mathbf{s}}\right) / q\right\rceil
$$

## Conclusion

- Introduced the NTWE problem with provable relations to NTRU and LWE problems


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- Estimated the concrete hardness of the NTWE problem based on the hardness of the natural corresponding lattice problem


## Conclusion

- Introduced the NTWE problem with provable relations to NTRU and LWE problems
- Estimated the concrete hardness of the NTWE problem based on the hardness of the natural corresponding lattice problem
- Constructed a NTWE-based cryptosystem with performance competitive with highly efficient lattice-based cryptosystems


## Questions?

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