NTWE: A Natural Combination of NTRU and LWE

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- Consider both the provable and concrete hardness of NTWE problem
- Construct and parametrize a NTWE-based cryptosystem

Lattice-Based Cryptography

- Primary candidate for post-quantum cryptography
- Lattice-based KEM and signature algorithm to be standardized by NIST

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Assumptions in Lattice-Based Cryptography

- Primary two building blocks are NTRU [HPS98] and LWE [Reg05] problems
- Interesting to investigate alternative hardness assumptions
- We introduce the NTWE problem as a new problem for lattice-based cryptography

- Use ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$ with integers n, q
- Typical parameters q = 3329, n = 256 and k < 5

Module-LWE MLWE(k)

Distinguish between uniformly random $(\overline{A} \in R_q^{m \times k}, \overline{b} \in R_q^m)$ and $(\overline{A}, \overline{b} = \overline{A} \cdot \overline{s} + \overline{e})$ with uniformly random \overline{A} and small $\overline{s} \in R_q^k$, $\overline{e} \in R_q^m$

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NTRU

Distinguish between uniformly random $h \in R_q$ and $h = gf^{-1}$ for small $g, f \in R_q$

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NTWE Problem NTWE(k)

Distinguish between uniformly random $(\overline{A} \in R_q^{m \times k}, \overline{b} \in R_q^m)$ and $(\overline{A}, \overline{b} = (\overline{A} \cdot \overline{s} + \overline{e})f^{-1})$ with uniformly random \overline{A} , small $\overline{e} \in R_q^m$, $\overline{s} \in R_q^k$ and $f \in R_q$

Problem Hardness

Provable Hardness

- NTWE problem a natural combination of NTRU and LWE problems
- Can easily see that the NTWE problem is not easier than either of these problems

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Concrete Hardness

- NTWE problem naturally corresponds to a lattice problem
- The hardness of this lattice problem gives a concrete hardness estimate for the NTWE problem

Provable Relation to MLWE problem

- Given MLWE(k) instance $\overline{A} \in \mathbb{R}_q^{m \times k}, \overline{b} \in \mathbb{R}_q^m$
- Sample f from correct distribution and $(\overline{A}, \overline{b} \cdot f^{-1})$ is an NTWE(k) instance
- Solving NTWE(k) instance gives solution to original MLWE(k) instance

Provable Relation to NTRU Problem

- Given NTRU instance with multiple samples $h_i = g_i f^{-1}$
- Sample **A** uniformly at random and produce NTWE instance with

$$b = Ah_{[1,...,k]} + h_{[k+1,...k+m]} (Ag_{[1,...,k]} + g_{[k+1,...k+m]}) \cdot f^{-1}$$

• Solving NTWE instance implies solution to original NTRU instance

Reduction From More Structured NTWE to MNTRU Problem

- More structured variant of NTWE(k) is at least as hard as MNTRU(k+1)
- Additional structure might make the NTWE problem harder
- More natural to assume that less structure corresponds to harder problems

• NTWE corresponds to problem of finding unusually short vector in a lattice

NTWE(k) Lattice

Lattice given by $oldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes kn}, oldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes n}$

- NTWE corresponds to problem of finding unusually short vector in a lattice
- NTWE(k) with H = A || B gives same type of lattice as MNTRU(k + 1)

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MNTRU(k+1) Lattice

Lattice given by $oldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes (k+1)n}$

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- NTWE(k) lattice very similar to MLWE(k + 1) lattice

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MNTRU(k+1) Lattice

Lattice given by $oldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes (k+1)n}$

MLWE(k + 1) Lattice

Lattice given by $oldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes (k+1)n}, oldsymbol{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes 1}$

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- NTWE corresponds to problem of finding unusually short vector in a lattice
- NTWE(k) with H = A || B gives same type of lattice as MNTRU(k + 1)
- NTWE(k) lattice very similar to MLWE(k + 1) lattice
- Concrete hardness of these types of lattice problems is well studied [CN11, Che13, APS15, ACD⁺18]

NTWE(k) Lattice

Lattice given by $oldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes kn}, oldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes n}$

MNTRU(k+1) Lattice

Lattice given by $oldsymbol{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes (k+1)n}$

MLWE(k+1) Lattice

Lattice given by $oldsymbol{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes (k+1)n}, oldsymbol{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn imes 1}$

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NTWE-Based Cryptosystem

Alice Bob

$$(\overline{A}, \overline{b} = (\overline{A} \cdot \overline{s} + \overline{e})f^{-1})$$

$$c_1 = \overline{s'} \cdot \overline{b} + e' + \lfloor Mq/2 \rfloor$$

$$\overline{c_2} = \overline{s'} \cdot \overline{A} + \overline{e''}$$

$$M = \lfloor 2(c_1 f - \overline{c}_2 \cdot \overline{s})/q \rceil \cdot f_2^{-1}$$

Cryptosystem Construction

- Use public matrix $\overline{oldsymbol{A}} \in R_q^{k imes (k-1)}$
- Ciphertext is k samples from MLWE(k) instance
- Decryption correct as products of $\overline{s}, \overline{e}, f, \overline{s}', e', \overline{e}''$ small

Comparable MLWE-Based Cryptosystem

Alice Bob

$$(\overline{A}, \overline{b} = \overline{A} \cdot \overline{s} + \overline{e})$$

$$c_1 = \overline{s'} \cdot \overline{b} + e' + \lfloor Mq/2 \rfloor$$

$$\overline{c_2} = \overline{s'} \cdot \overline{A} + \overline{e''}$$

 $M = \lfloor 2(c_1 - \overline{c}_2 \cdot \overline{s})/q
ceil$

Cryptosystem Construction

- Public matrix $\overline{A} \in R_q^{k \times k}$
- Ciphertext is k + 1 samples from MLWE(k) instance
- Decryption correct as products of $\overline{s}, \overline{e}, \overline{s}', \overline{e}''$ and e' small

Parametrizations of NTWE-Based Cryptosystem

- Parametrizations with same ring $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^{256} + 1)$ and modulos q = 3329 as in Kyber [SAB⁺22]
- Similar distributions for \overline{s} and \overline{e} as in Kyber
- More efficient than Kyber as requires fewer operations of equivalent cost

Version	NTWE-768	Kyber-768	NTWE-1024	Kyber-1024
Core SVP	182	183	256	256
Dimension of $\overline{\mathbf{A}}$	3 imes 2	3×3	4 × 3	4 imes 4
PK size (bytes)	1184	1184	1568	1568
CT size (bytes)	1152	1088	1536	1568
δ	2^{-182}	2^{-164}	2^{-153}	2^{-174}

Ciphertext Compression

- MLWE-based cryptosystems use ciphertext compression to allow for smaller ciphertexts
- Ciphertext compression not suitable for all applications
- NTWE-based cryptosystem without ciphertext compression allows more efficient encryption and decryption

MLWE ciphertext

Without compression





Efficiency of Operations

- Multiplication, inversion and addition in R_q efficient with NTT
- Multiplication and inversion in R₂ during decryption less efficient as not performed with
- Sampling f such that it is trivial in R_2 ensures no operations in R_2 are required

Alice Bob $(\overline{A}, \overline{b} = (\overline{A} \cdot \overline{s} + \overline{e})f^{-1})$ $(\overline{A}, \overline{b} = \overline{A} \cdot \overline{s} + \overline{e})$ $c_1 = \overline{s}' \cdot \overline{b} + e' + \lfloor Mq/2 \rfloor$ $\overline{c}_2 = \overline{s}' \cdot \overline{A} + \overline{e}''$

$$M = \lfloor 2(c_1 t - \overline{c}_2 \cdot \overline{s})/q \mid t_2^{-1}$$

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ceil$

Efficiency of Operations

- Multiplication, inversion and addition in R_q efficient with NTT
- Multiplication and inversion in R₂ during decryption less efficient as not performed with
- Sampling f such that it is trivial in R₂ ensures no operations in R₂ are required

Alice Boh $\frac{(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}},\overline{\boldsymbol{b}}=(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}\cdot\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}})f^{-1})}{(\overline{\boldsymbol{A}},\overline{\boldsymbol{b}}=\overline{\boldsymbol{A}}\cdot\overline{\boldsymbol{s}}+\overline{\boldsymbol{e}})}$ $c_1 = \overline{\mathbf{s}}' \cdot \overline{\mathbf{b}} + e' + \lfloor Mq/2 \rceil$ $\overline{\mathbf{c}}_2 = \overline{\mathbf{s}}' \cdot \overline{\mathbf{A}} + \overline{\mathbf{e}}''$ $M = \lfloor 2(c_1 f - \overline{c}_2 \cdot \overline{s})/q \rfloor$

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Conclusion

• Introduced the NTWE problem with provable relations to NTRU and LWE problems

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- Estimated the concrete hardness of the NTWE problem based on the hardness of the natural corresponding lattice problem

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- Introduced the NTWE problem with provable relations to NTRU and LWE problems
- Estimated the concrete hardness of the NTWE problem based on the hardness of the natural corresponding lattice problem
- Constructed a NTWE-based cryptosystem with performance competitive with highly efficient lattice-based cryptosystems

Questions?

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